Human Capital and Gender Wage Gaps: What is the Explained Difference?

Ronald L. Oaxaca

University of Arizona

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 - To what extent are constraints exogenous? Max utility s.t. income, but income depends on previous choices.
 - To what extent are exogenous constraints equitably distributed across gender?

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 - One argument is that observed gender wage gaps measure productivity differences (an assumed result).
 - Another argument is that observed gender wage gaps measure labor market discrimination (an assumed result).
 - Apparently, there is no need to run a single regression!

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- Measurement of human capital is easier said than done.

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ullet Let the marginal rate of return to schooling, r, be defined as

$$r = \frac{\partial \ell n F(S, A)}{\partial S}.$$

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- An individual's discounting rate of interest, i, is uniquely fixed and does not vary with the level of schooling.
- However, since i can also be interpreted as the marginal opportunity cost of an additional year of school, i can vary across individuals.

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
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Oifferentiating the log present value function with respect to S, for a given V, yields i which indexes an individual's supply curve thereby establishing the relationship between the supply of schooling and the discounting rate of interest.

 The individual's years of schooling optimization problem is represented in the following figure.






Figure 1

 A labor market with equal opportunity but unequal ability is represented in the following figure.




Figure 2

 A labor market with equal abilities but unequal opportunity is represented in the following figure.




Figure 3

- A labor market with unequal opportunity and unequal abilities is represented in the next figure.
- This figure illustrates why a regression of the form

$$\ell n(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \varepsilon_i$$

is not identified and why β_1 does not identify r, the marginal rate of return to schooling.




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- Alternative identification strategies are used to estimate the model for white males in the U.S.
- Even in this simple model, one can see that gender differences in schooling result from differences in constraints and voluntary choices.

Standard log wage model

$$\ell n(w_{mi}) = X'_{mi}\beta_m + \varepsilon_{mi}, i = 1, ...N_m$$

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 - In the absence of discrimination $\beta_m = \beta_f = \beta^*$
 - Endowments (X) are voluntary labor supply side outcomes, though it
 is generally recognized that pre-labor market discrimination can
 generate gender differences in X.

• Standard Wage Decomposition - Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973)

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- $\bar{X}'_f(\hat{\beta}_m \hat{\beta}_f)$ can be taken to be an estimate of discrimination but is sometimes referred to as the "unexplained" gap.

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 - The same methodology is used to estimate union/nonunion wage differentials, public/private sector wage differentials, manufacturing/nonmanufacturing differentials, etc. – why are not these also labeled "unexplained"?
 - Standard wage specifications are used, so why are these equations suddenly misspecified when it is learned that they will be used to estimate discrimination against women?

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- \bar{X}'_m $(\hat{\beta}_m \hat{\beta}^*) + \bar{X}'_f$ $(\hat{\beta}^* \hat{\beta}_f)$ is an estimate of overall discrimination against women.

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 - In the broader labor market what might statistically appear to be pure wage discrimination probably reflects the incidence of women being employed in lower wage firms.
- Much of the gender disparity in wages is associated with gender disparity in job titles/occupational categories.

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$$\ell n(E_t) = \ell n(E_0) + \tilde{r} \sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1} k_{\tau} - \delta t$$

where E_t is earnings capacity in period t, E_0 is earnings capacity in the initial period of work following the completion of schooling, \tilde{r} is the rate of return to post-schooling investments (OJT), k_{τ} is the fraction of time or time-equivalent invested in OJT in each period prior to t, and δ is the depreciation rate on post schooling human capital.

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• Generally, earnings capacity is not observed. What is observed is earnings net of current human capital investment (Y_t) :

ullet In the Mincer framework E_0 includes the earnings effect of schooling:

$$\ell n(E_0) = \ell n(Y_0) + \bar{r}S$$

where Y_0 represents pre-labor market earnings capacity not associated with schooling (S), e.g. ability, family back ground, minimum wage laws, etc., and \bar{r} is an average of the marginal rates of return to each year of schooling (could include depreciation).

• Generally, earnings capacity is not observed. What is observed is earnings net of current human capital investment (Y_t) :

$$\ell n(Y_t) = \ell n(E_t) - k_t$$

$$= \ell n(Y_0) + \bar{r}S + \tilde{r} \sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1} k_{\tau} - \delta t - k_t$$
(1)

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 $\approx k_{0}t - \frac{k_{0}t^{2}}{2T}$

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$$\ell n(Y_t) = [\ell n(Y_0) - k_0] + \bar{r}S + \left(\tilde{r}k_0 + \frac{k_0}{T} - \delta\right)t - \frac{\tilde{r}k_0t^2}{2T}$$
 (4)

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• The interpretation of the parameters according to our formulation of the Mincer model are given by

$$\beta_0 = \ell n(Y_0) - k_0$$

$$\beta_1 = \bar{r} > 0$$

$$\beta_2 = \tilde{r}k_0 + \frac{k_0}{T} - \delta > 0 \text{ (since } \tilde{r}k_0 > \delta)$$

$$\beta_3 = -\frac{\tilde{r}k_0}{2T} < 0$$

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- In the light of the Mincer model, should gender differences in the β coefficients from the standard human capital earnings model be interpreted as part of the unexplained wage gap?
- How should gender differences in the constituent human capital parameters Y_0 , k_0 , \bar{r} , \tilde{r} , δ , and T be regarded in terms of discrimination/unexplained versus explained/human capital components?

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- Consider the standard Heckman selection model in the context of a simple two-equation model of wage determination and employment
- Let the employment and wage functions for individual i in gender group j be given by

$$L_i^* = H_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i,$$

$$\ell n(w_i) = X_i' \beta + u_i$$

where L_i^* is a latent variable associated with being employed, H_i' , is a vector of determinants of employment, w_i is the market wage, X_i' is a vector of determinants of market wages, γ and β are the associated parameter vectors, and ε_i and u_i are i.i.d error terms that follow a bivariate normal distribution $(0,0,1,\sigma_u,\rho)$.

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• Wages are observed for those for whom $L_i^* > 0$, so that the expected wage of an employed individual is determined according to

$$E(\ell n(w_i) \mid L_i^* > 0) = X_i' \beta + E(u_i \mid \varepsilon_i > -H_i' \gamma)$$

= $X_i' \beta + \theta \lambda_i$,

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• The estimating equation for employed individuals may be expressed as

$$\ell n(w_i) \mid L_i^* > 0 = X_i' \beta + \theta \lambda_i + error.$$

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$$\overline{\ell n(w_m)} - \overline{\ell n(w_f)} = \overline{X}_f' \left(\widehat{\beta}_m - \widehat{\beta}_f \right) + \left(\overline{X}_m - \overline{X}_f \right)' \widehat{\beta}_m \\
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 where
$$\widehat{\lambda}_f^0 &= \sum_{i=1}^{N_{1f}} \widehat{\lambda}_{if}^0 / N_f \text{ , and } \widehat{\lambda}_{if}^0 &= \phi(H_{if}' \, \widehat{\gamma}_m) / \Phi(H_{if}' \, \widehat{\gamma}_m). \end{split}$$

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• The term $\hat{\lambda}_f^0$ is the mean value of the IMR if females faced the same selection equation that the men face.

• The term $\widehat{\theta}_m(\widehat{\lambda}_f^0 - \widehat{\lambda}_f)$ measures the effects of gender differences in the parameters of the probit selectivity equation on the male/female wage differential.

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 How do we treat gender differences in the parameters of the selection process? Explained (human capital)? Unexplained (discrimination)?

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$$\bar{w} = exp(\bar{X}\hat{\beta} + \hat{\theta}),$$

where
$$\hat{\theta} = \ell n \left(N \bar{w} \right) - \ell n \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \left[\exp(X' \, \hat{\beta}) \right] \right\}$$

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- Let the log wage residual $\varepsilon = \alpha \nu$, where α is the return to unobserved skills and ν is an index of unobserved skills such that $\nu \sim N(0, \sigma_{\nu}^2)$.

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 - α and σ_{ν}^2 could differ by gender. Discrimination? Human capital?
 - It is not obvious whether to use $\hat{\theta}_m$ or $\hat{\theta}_f$ to predict the mean female wage in the absence of discrimination.

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- Consider a standard Mincer type earnings model

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}S_{i} + \beta_{2}X_{i}^{*} + \beta_{3}X_{i}^{*2} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_{i}H_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}, i = 1, ..., N,$$

= $W^{*}\gamma + \varepsilon$

where Y is the natural log of the hourly wage, S is the schooling level, X^* is actual work experience, H is a set of K other control variables, ε is a random error term, i indexes the individual, and N represents the sample size.

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where Y is the natural log of the hourly wage, S is the schooling level, X^* is actual work experience, H is a set of K other control variables, ε is a random error term, i indexes the individual, and N represents the sample size.

• Taking the probability limit of the OLS estimator yields,

$$plim(\widehat{\gamma}) = \gamma + \Sigma_{W^*W^*}^{-1} \Sigma_{W^*\varepsilon},$$

which is consistent only if $plim(N^{-1}W^{*'}\varepsilon) = \Sigma_{W^*\varepsilon} = 0$.

• Suppose that actual work experience, X^* , is unobserved. Instead one observes potential experience X (age-schooling-6)

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$$\varepsilon^* = \varepsilon - v\beta_2 - 2[X^* \odot v]\beta_3 - [v \odot v]\beta_3$$
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where $X^* \odot v$ and $v \odot v$ are Hadamard products (i.e. element by element multiplication between X^* and v and between v and v, respectively).

More compactly, the misspecified earnings model can be expressed as,

$$Y = W\gamma + \varepsilon^*$$
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The error vector ε^* is given by

$$\varepsilon^* = \varepsilon - v\beta_2 - 2[X^* \odot v]\beta_3 - [v \odot v]\beta_3$$
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$$\textit{plim}(\widehat{\gamma}) = \gamma - \Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{Wv} \beta_2 - 2\Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W,X^* \odot v} \beta_3 - \Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W,v \odot v} \beta_3,$$

assuming $\Sigma_{W/W}^{-1}\Sigma_{W\varepsilon}=0$.

• Consider the standard decomposition of gender wage gaps:

$$\begin{split} \bar{Y}_{m} - \bar{Y}_{f} &= \left(\bar{X}^{m,a} - \bar{X}^{f,a} \right) \widehat{\beta}^{m,a} + \bar{X}^{f,a} \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,a} \right) \\ &= \left(\bar{X}^{m,j} - \bar{X}^{f,j} \right) \widehat{\beta}^{m,j} + \bar{X}^{f,j} \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,j} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,j} \right), \end{split}$$

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 The effects of experience specification bias on the endowment (explained) component of the wage decomposition can be decomposed into parameter bias and mean experience measure bias:

$$\begin{split} & \left(\bar{X}^{m,a} - \bar{X}^{f,a} \right) \widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \left(\bar{X}^{m,j} - \bar{X}^{f,j} \right) \widehat{\beta}^{m,j} = \\ & \left(\bar{X}^{m,a} - \bar{X}^{f,a} \right) \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \widehat{\beta}^{m,j} \right) \\ & + \left[\left(\bar{X}^{m,a} - \bar{X}^{f,a} \right) - \left(\bar{X}^{m,j} - \bar{X}^{f,j} \right) \right] \widehat{\beta}^{m,j}. \end{split}$$

 The effects of experience specification bias on the discrimination (unexplained) component of the wage decomposition can also be decomposed into parameter bias and mean experience measure bias:

$$\begin{split} \bar{X}^{f,a} \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,a} \right) - \bar{X}^{f,j} \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,j} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,j} \right) = \\ \\ \bar{X}^{f,j} \left[\left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,a} \right) - \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,j} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,j} \right) \right] \\ \\ + \left(\bar{X}^{f,a} - \bar{X}^{f,j} \right) \left(\widehat{\beta}^{m,a} - \widehat{\beta}^{f,a} \right). \end{split}$$

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- Possible quality differences in acquired human capital may be related to unequal constraints faced by men and women.